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Christian Bromberger 
 
Ta’zie (Religious Theatre) vs. Noruz (the New Year and its Rituals) 
The Politics of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in Iran and in UNESCO 
 
 
Above and beyond a legitimate concern with preserving intangible cultural “treasures” and 
“masterpieces,” what are the extra-heritage issues that tend to slip beneath UNESCO’S 
applications for recognition and listing?  Through an examination of recent projects presented 
by Iran, I propose to carry out a modest ethnography that addresses the meaning of these 
applications, ethnography being in the words of Clifford Geertz (Geertz 1983: 152), “an 
enterprise (…) whose aim is to render obscure matters intelligible by providing them with an 
informing context.” 
In 2005, Iran submitted two files supporting masterpiece-of-the-intangible-heritage 
applications, one on behalf of ta’zie or shabikhani (a form of religious tragedy unique to 
Shiite Islam) and the second concerning the rituals of Noruz (the New Year coinciding with 
the spring equinox).  I will first provide a brief presentation of these two candidacies before 
examining what behind-the-scenes machinations underlie them. 
 
Ta’zie 
 
The first file, prepared by Tehran’s Center of Dramatic Arts, included a series of documents 
concerning theatre performances of the “history-myth” of Kerbala and the events associated 
with it.  In October 680, on Ashura (the 10th day of Muharram, which is the first month of the 
Muslim calendar), Hussein, the son of Ali and grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, was 
massacred, along with all of his followers and all but two male members of his family, by 
troops loyal to Yazid, the Umayyad caliph, on the site of Kerbala, near the Euphrates River, in 
present-day Iraq.  The painful passion and martyrdom of Hussein, the third Shiite Imam,1 
constitutes the major horizon, the paradigm of grassroots religiosity, and the wellspring of the 
current division between Shiites and Sunnis.  The commemoration of the torment of the 
“prince of the martyrs” (seyyed al-shohada) is expressed through painful rituals during the 
first 10 days of Muharram that reach their peak on the 10th day of the month:  processions of 
                                                
1 Ali is the first Imam, with the second being Hussein’s brother Hasan.  Iranian Shiites recognize 12 Imams, all 
of whom perished in tragic circumstances, with the exception of the 12th who disappeared in 874, whose 
“occultation” persists to this day, and whose followers await the second coming. 
 2 
penitents flagellating themselves with the palms of their hands and/or with chains, or, in days 
gone by,2 even wounding their own scalps with swords or sabres, while sermons, hymns and 
theatre performances commemorating the Kerbala drama give voice to these days of 
mourning and affliction.  On the very day of Ashura, at the conclusion of the ceremonial cycle, 
the final scenes of the drama are repeated by the faithful in the courts of numerous shrines:  
the burning of the tents of members of the holy family, the murder of the Imam whose white 
horse is covered in blood, the abandoned cradles of the child martyrs, etc.   
Ta’zie is therefore a sort of dramatized ritual, a theatre genre similar to the Christian mystery 
plays of the Middle Ages that represented the Passion of Christ.  There are several hundred 
variations of ta’zie,3 most of them of anonymous origin, written in simple language and 
performed by non-professional actors accompanied by a small orchestra (the texts are usually 
sung).  Performances normally take place in public places or on premises (tekie) specially 
dedicated to the preparation of ceremonies and to these types of events.  Whatever the theme, 
and a fortiori if the ta’zie  in question directly evokes the drama of Kerbala, two categories of 
characters square off during performances:  the good and virtuous (Hussein and his followers), 
emblems of justice and purity, dressed in green, solemnly chanting their complaints and 
praising the redemptive sacrifice of the Imam ; and the evildoers (Yazid and his soldiers, as 
well as Shemr, the perpetrator of the monstrous crime, i.e. the murder of Hussein); 
symbolizing tyranny and oppression, these villains are dressed in red and mauve and declaim 
or chant their text in a staccato tone, their eyes bulging and threatening.  The performers 
(ta’ziekhan) are all males, even those playing female characters.  They do not, literally 
speaking, identify with their roles; they are simple imitators who, when playing the “bad 
guys,” occasionally display the disgust that their roles inspire them to express. 
Ta’zie is firmly anchored in Iran’s national and religious traditions.  It was codified under the 
great Safavid Dynasty (1501-1722), which elevated Shia Islam to the status of a state religion; 
it subsequently developed in the 18th century under the Afshars and Zands, and reached its 
zenith in the 19th century under the Qajar.  In that era, splendid tekie were constructed, 
including the celebrated tekie dowlat (“government tekie”) in Tehran, which was destroyed 
during the Pahlavi Dynasty (1925-1979).  Whereas the Qajar had encouraged and sponsored 
                                                
2 This practice was outlawed by religious authorities in 1994 and has remained so ever since. 
3 Among the most celebrated are the ta’zie of Muslim (sent by Hussein and killed along with his children by Ibn 
Ziyad, the commander of Yazid’s troops); of Horr (a brave soldier who repents and rallies to the cause of the 
Imam); of the death of Zeynab (the Imam’s brave sister); of Mokhtar (who made sure that those responsible for 
the Kerbala massacre were put to death five years later); and of the Four Birds and the Jewish girl (in which a 
blind girl recovers her sight after a drop of Imam Hussein’s blood, transported by birds, miraculously falls on her 
eyes). 
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ta’zie performances as a means of consolidating their power on a cultural level, the Pahlavi 
rulers (Reza and his son Mohammed Reza), the creators of a modern, Western-oriented state 
that prioritized the grandiose, pre-Islamic past of their empire, outlawed this theatre genre, 
which was not rehabilitated until the end of the dynasty, when the last Shah and his wife 
implemented a policy designed to showcase popular Iranian arts and traditions by way of 
sumptuous international festivals.  This rehabilitation movement was encouraged by 
nationalist intellectuals who were eager to underline, rightly or wrongly, the pre-Islamic 
origins of the character of Hussein, a hero directly descended, in their view, from Siyavosh, 
an innocent victim of human hatred, whose legend and martyrdom is recounted in Ferdowsi’s 
10th century Book of the Kings.   
In a general context of iconophobia and theatrophobia (much less pronounced than in Sunni 
Islam however), the Shiite clergy has adopted various positions over the centuries, sometimes 
condemning and sometimes accepting this performance genre in which actors playing holy 
characters appear on stage and fantastic and occasionally comical episodes intersect.  In spite 
of their misgivings concerning the orthodox nature of this type of entertainment, Islamic 
Republic officials have authorized it, considering that these performances provide the faithful 
with an opportunity to strengthen and demonstrate their faith.  Spectators do not in fact 
remain passive when confronted with these dramas; instead they insult and upbraid the 
“villains,” while lamenting by beating their chests during the most tragic episodes.  Ta’zie is 
definitely a major symbol of the Shiite world, as proven not only in Iran but also in Iraq, the 
emirates, Lebanon, India, etc., to such an extent that the entire region sharing these points of 
reference could be qualified as Ta’ziestan. 
Ta’zie fully meets all six UNESCO criteria that define a masterpiece of the intangible heritage.  
It is an original genre, rooted in a cultural tradition, a symbol of identity, bringing together 
literary texts, instrumental music and high quality stage design; although in decline, ta’zie 
remains a living tradition, appreciated differently by different categories of spectators (men or 
women, young or old, the educated elite or the masses – each group is more sensitive to one 
particular aspect of the drama or another:  the tyranny and injustice of the “villains,” the 
mother-child relationships, the literary quality of the texts, the actors’ performances, etc.; but 
it is also a genre that is on the verge of disappearing or of being rendered aesthetically 
artificial; it finds itself challenged in the marketplace by modern entertainment (television 
series, etc.), threatened by a loss of knowledge of its roots and traditions, and without any 
measure of protection having been enacted in its defence.  There is why ta’zie is an ideal 
candidate for UNESCO recognition.  
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Noruz 
However, while it was on the road to being recognized as a masterpiece of the intangible 
heritage and a major symbol of Iranian identity, ta’zie encountered a formidable rival, Noruz 
(“the new day”), which inaugurates the beginning of the year at the spring equinox4.  The 
solar calendar to which the Noruz festival belongs sharply contrasts with the Muslim lunar 
calendar and is one of the powerful symbols of the specificity of the Iranian world, going all 
the way back to antiquity.  According to tradition, Noruz perpetuates and commemorates the 
day of the creation of the world by Ahura Mazda.  Numerous rites and rituals, similar to those 
which inaugurated spring in many societies of the ancient world, extol and celebrate the New 
Year:  major spring cleaning (khane tekani); buying new clothes; decorating eggs; the 
germination of wheat, barley or lentil seeds, which are left to grow in a plate and which 
provide sabze (greens); and preparing a pastry (samanu) made from wheat sap and sugar.  The 
last two preparations are among the haft sin (the seven “s”), i.e. the seven foods whose names 
begin with an “s,” which are placed on a tablecloth spread on the floor during this inaugural 
time.  The evening before the last Wednesday of the year (called “red Wednesday,” chahar 
shanbe suri), a fire is lit, over which members of the household or community jump while 
repeating “Zardi o ranjuri-ye man be to, sorxi o xarami-ye to be man” (“My pallor and my 
sorrow for you; your flush and your gaiety for me”); other practices punctuate this transition 
period:  masquerades, songs (noruzkhani), divination sessions, ritual flights, the matching of 
wishes carried out by young boys, etc.  This new year cycle ends on the 13th of the first month, 
the sizdah bedar (“the 13th out!”).  In order to exorcize the bad luck associated with the 
number 13, families leave their houses and picnic in a green space.  To mark the end of the 
Noruz period, the sabze is thrown in the sea or in a watercourse and the haft sin tablecloth is 
put away.  
Whereas, as stated earlier, ta’zie is willingly presented by nationalists as a genre whose 
origins are rooted in pre-Islamic mythology, Noruz, a custom already sanctioned in antiquity, 
has been Islamized over the course of the centuries:  this inaugural day supposedly coincides 
with Gabriel’s descending to the prophet Mohammed, with the nomination of Ali by 
Mohammed as his legitimate successor, and even with the second coming of the Hidden 
Imam (see Note 1).  Leaving aside these more subtle distinctions, ta’zie and Noruz clearly 
have conflicting profiles and could be described in terms of structural oppositions:  ta’zie is 
                                                
4 On Noruz, among other sources, see Bromberger (2013a and 2013b). 
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basically a religious genre arousing pain and evoking suffering, as opposed to Noruz, which is 
fundamentally a lay celebration and a symbol of rejoicing.  The two rites may overlap some 
years, since ta’zie is part of the lunar calendar and Noruz, the solar calendar.  When this 
occurs, expressions of jubilation are reduced to a minimum and disappear behind a 
commemoration of mourning.  In 2006, for example, the 40th day following Ashura, which is 
also commemorated by an affliction ritual, coincided with Noruz.  Official posters proposed a 
compromise for the benefit of the prince of martyrs: “Noruz-e man bar Hoseyn ast” (“My 
Noruz is for Hussein”).  
Like ta’zie, Noruz presents all the qualities of a solid candidate for the list of the Masterpieces 
of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity: it is rooted in tradition, original, a symbol of 
identity, and is of historical and aesthetic interest.  Indeed all of UNESCO’s requisite 
qualifications can easily be applied to this renewal rite which, unlike ta’zie, is not on the 
verge of disappearing. 
 
A candidacy and the issues it encounters 
 
In 2005, Iran therefore applied to have these two indisputable “masterpieces» included in the 
list of the Masterpieces of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity:  ta’zie was 
submitted as a strictly national event, and Noruz was put forth in conjunction with nine other 
countries which share this custom to a lesser or greater extent:  Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, India (where the Zoroastrian community is of 
Iranian origin), Azerbaijan, and Turkey.  Iran ultimately withdrew the candidacy of ta’zie, 
maintaining only the Noruz application, which was rejected by the UNESCO jury on the basis 
that the file was incomplete, a decision provoking a great deal of bitterness and controversy. 
 
As this factual presentation draws to an end, three questions arise:  Why was the candidacy of 
ta’zie withdrawn in extremis?  Why does Noruz stir up such insistence and so much 
consternation?  Why do so many Iranians put such importance on including a cultural asset of 
this sort on the list of masterpieces of the intangible cultural heritage, whereas this type of 
measure arouses at best lukewarm interest in other countries (for instance, the mayor of 
Tarascon, a small community in the south of France, was not even aware of the candidacy of 
his community’s local celebration of the Tarasque or of its being included, along with other 
Belgian ceremonies celebrating giants, on the prestigious “masterpiece” list). 
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In the final analysis, don’t these candidacies, and the steps accompanying them, teach us as 
much about the politico-cultural debates shaking a country as about what actually constitutes 
a “masterpiece” of the intangible cultural heritage? 
These applications were prepared in the context of the first few years of the 21st century, 
during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when officials in charge of the 
nation’s culture and heritage files were moved by a concern with openness combined with a 
national pride that served to highlight Iranian specificities and minimize the bonds of Islamic 
solidarity, even those of a Shiite nature.  (Anti-Arabism is a major component of this 
nationalist current.)  In a significant manner, the ta’zie file, which could have included 
comparisons with other Shiite nations where the genre is also recognized, was exclusively 
centred on Iran. Nevertheless Noruz file was given priority, thus serving as a reminder, in the 
context of a struggle for influence with Russia and China in central Asia, of the historic 
importance of the Iranian civilization and empire.  It is true that “greater Iran” (Iran-e bozorg) 
has left a powerful mark all the way from Mesopotamia to western China.  In addition to Iran, 
Afghanistan and Tajikistan also recognize Persian as a national language, and an important 
minority in Uzbekistan speaks it as well.  Most states in the Caucasus were part of the Iranian 
empire until the first quarter of the 19th century.  The insistence on this shared history and 
common heritage has been reflected in a vast array of cultural initiatives. On pourrait appeler 
ces pays de tradition iranienne le Noruzestan. In 2004, under the auspices of Iran’s UNESCO 
commission, a workshop concerning the role of women in the transmission and protection of 
the intangible heritage was held in Tehran ; it brought together participants from the 
aforementioned “parent” countries (with the exception of India), as well as representatives of 
Armenia and Georgia.  In Iran, a number of books and conferences were recently dedicated to 
Noruz, with the first convention focusing explicitly on the theme held in March 2000 in 
Persepolis, the sentimental capital of the Achaemenid emperors.  “Brother countries” 
participated in many of these events, such as the April 2006 celebrations in Sari, located in 
northern Iran, where the impressive “First International Festival of Common Heritage of 
Caspian Sea Regional Countries and Central Asia” was held, with Noruz as its glorified 
symbol.  During these various symposiums, the officials in charge of Iran’s heritage file 
present their country as the “father’s house” (khane-ye pedari), while taking all sorts of 
rhetorical precautions in order to avoid ruffling their neighbours’ feathers.  For example, they 
will upon occasion mention that the centres of Iranian civilization have not always been 
situated in Iran.  Aren’t Bukhara and Samarcand located in present-day Uzbekistan?  
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Noruz, along with its associated rites, culinary customs, songs, narratives and beliefs, 
undoubtedly deserves to be officially recognized and showcased by UNESCO.  The festival 
represents a set of original traditions that need to be preserved.  But it would be naïve to think 
that cultural arguments alone are at the origin of this application for recognition as a 
masterpiece of the intangible heritage, a candidacy that is supposedly the product of expert 
consensus.  Intentions reflecting hegemonic ambitions, nationalist and secessionist claims, 
and counter-offensives by various states have all played a key role in determining the 
dynamics and failures of the project.  A number of countries have been keen to learn from 
their mistakes (Iran, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, for example); others appear to be less 
enthusiastic pupils, for instance Turkey (playing second fiddle in a cultural operation under 
the auspices of Iran is definitely not to the liking of Turkish leaders).  Of course some aspects 
of these failures cannot be explained by ulterior motives of a political nature.  But the choice 
or ratification by one or several states of a masterpiece candidate leads us both to ask 
questions about the quality of a cultural asset and the file prepared to present its candidacy as 
well as the purpose and intentions underlying the project itself.       
We also need to take note of the special interest, even determination, of certain states in 
making sure that their national heritage benefits from the prestigious UNESCO label.  
Without a doubt, such recognition opens up all sorts of remarkable possibilities for tourist 
development, even at the risk of leading to a “folklorization” of the very practice one intends 
to protect.  It is, for example, significant that in Iran matters of national heritage and tourism 
are grouped together within the same organization.  However, above and beyond the latter 
point, it is a state’s desire to be recognized on the international stage, as much as the 
recognition of a given cultural asset, that accounts for the passionate atmosphere surrounding 
these candidacy files.  This concern for distinction is all the stronger when the country making 
the application has a bad reputation.  For opponents of such “delinquent” regimes, who often 
take refuge in NGOs, such recognition offers a means of proclaiming that the face of their 
nation is different from the one shown by their government.  For the government in place, 
such recognition is an unexpected opportunity to have the country it heads spoken of 
positively, to refurbish its tarnished image, to give itself a little more “soul,” even to provide a 
distraction.  The reactions in Iran after Noruz was rejected as a candidate for the list of 
masterpieces of the intangible cultural heritage testify to the intensity of these symbolic issues.  
The opaque nature of UNESCO procedures were roundly condemned; some saw in this 
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refusal the result of an Israeli plot; others blamed the backwardness of “brother countries” 
who did not fulfill their commitments, etc.5  
 
Some years after, UNESCO final recognition 
  
Finally, Noruz candidacy to Intangible Heritage of Humanity has been accepted in September-
October 2009 during the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible 
heritage, held in Abu Dhabi. The candidacy was submitted by Iran, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Turkey. As for ta’zie, following a new candidacy, it has 
been inscribed on UNESCO’s list in November 2010, during the session held in Nairobi 
(Kenya).  
Ce qui frappe à la lecture des dossiers de candidature approuvés par l’UNESCO, ce sont les 
aises qu’ont prises leurs auteurs avec la réalité. Jugez du peu. Les auteurs du dossier sur le 
ta’zie affirment: « Le ta’ziye est joué dans tout le pays par les musulmans iraniens ». Faut-il 
rappeler que l’Iran compte une forte minorité (10 à 15% de la population) de sunnites (au 
Kurdistan, au Baloutchestan, dans la steppe turkmène…), sunnites qui sont  stigmatisés dans 
ces pièces de théâtre. Inutile de dire que le ta’zie n’est pas pratiqué dans ces communautés. 
Les sunnites ne seraient donc pas musulmans ? Quelques lignes plus bas, les auteurs du 
dossier avancent que l’ « élément » est pratiqué « dans toutes les villes et tous les villages », 
ce qui est notoirement faux. Plus loin, les mêmes auteurs attribuent au ta’zie le pouvoir 
d’ « unir les peuples » et de répandre « l’amour et l’amitié ». Que les auteurs de cette 
candidature, et l’État qui en est responsable, tentent de mettre toutes les chances de leur côté, 
en présentant le ta’zie comme un genre œcuménique, c’est, pour ainsi dire, de bonne guerre, 
sinon de bonne morale scientifique. Mais il est plus étonnant que l’assemblée de l’UNESCO 
entérine ces billevesées en déclarant dans sa décision : « R.1 : Le ta‘zīye est un art rituel 
important de l’Iran à travers lequel la société transmet ses valeurs culturelles et religieuses, lui 
procurant un sentiment de continuité et créant des liens entre les différentes communautés en 
Iran ; R.2 : Son inscription sur la Liste représentative pourrait contribuer au renforcement des 
liens régionaux et renforcer les valeurs éthiques et culturelles, favorisant ainsi le respect de la 
diversité culturelle et le dialogue interculturel ». On ne comprend pas en quoi la stigmatisation 
d’une communauté religieuse par une autre peut contribuer au dialogue interculturel. Faut-il 
pour autant récuser la présence du ta’zie sur la Liste du patrimoine immatériel ? Certainement 
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pas. Le ta’zie correspond parfaitement aux six critères retenus par l’UNESCO pour définir un 
chef d’œuvre du « patrimoine immatériel ».    
Venons-en à Noruz. L’UNESCO entend, par l’inscription sur la prestigieuse liste du 
patrimoine immatériel, « promouvoir la célébration d'une forme paisible et, dans le même 
temps, unifiante de la diversité culturelle ». Or rien n’est moins « paisible » et « unifiant » que 
cette coutume ; dans toute l’aire où Noruz est attesté, la « tradition » a fait l’objet de 
controverses et d’interdictions. En Iran, pendant les dix premières années ayant suivi la 
Révolution de 1979, les autorités islamiques, soucieuses de propager une idéologie chiite 
révolutionnaire, avaient combattu et tenté de réduire au minimum les coutumes 
« spécifiquement iraniennes », au premier chef Noruz, qui avaient été valorisées par la 
dynastie pahlavi au nom du nationalisme culturel. Starting in the 1990s, when a period of 
relative liberalization was ushered in by the Islamic regime, a renewed national pride 
reasserted its claims, and “specifically Iranian” folklore was even partially rehabilitated to 
fight against “the Western cultural invasion” (“tahajom-e farhangi-ye qarb”).  Ethnologists 
and, more generally, nationalist intellectuals rushed into this breach to such an extent that 
seminars, conferences and books about Noruz abounded.  A sort of “Noruzmania” seemed to 
have taken hold of cultural circles. Strong echoes of the phenomenon were felt in those 
countries of central Asia and the Caucasus that are encompassed, as forementioned, by the 
extended historical reach of Iranian civilization and share the same calendar.  The latter states 
proclaim this shared reference to Noruz even more strongly given that celebrating the festival 
was outlawed during the Soviet era and that the renewal of festivities symbolized the end of 
communism and the advent of national independence.  From 1926 to 1988, the rites of Noruz 
were in fact practiced only secretly in a family context.  One of the first measures taken by the 
new states upon becoming independent, or even earlier with perestroika, was to restore Noruz, 
which was quickly declared their national holiday.  Such was the case in Uzbekistan where 
this rehabilitation was officially recognized by presidential decree in February 1989, followed 
by the creation of the Navruz Foundation and then the Navruz International Charity 
Foundation in 1992.  In Afghanistan, the festival was banned by the Soviets, then by the 
Taliban, before being celebrated with great fervour after the overthrow of the latter regime. Le 
statut de Noruz est aussi highly controversial en Turquie. At the beginning of the 20th century, 
celebrating Newroz was a dying custom among the Kurds of Turkey (who are, it should be 
recalled, a people of Iranian origin) before nationalist intellectuals elevated it to the level of a 
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national holiday at the end of the second decade of the 20th century.6  During the 1960s, 
Kurdish militant seized upon this date and this symbol as a focal point for demonstrations and 
mass mobilization.  For instance on Newroz day in 1984, 34 militants set themselves ablaze in 
the Diyarbakir military prison.  Moreover, the Alevi religious minority, firmly implanted in 
eastern Turkey, soon became another active participant in this pursuit of rallying symbols.  A 
segment of the Alevis were undoubtedly accustomed to celebrating Nevruz, but the 
revitalization7 of the festival coincided with the political claims and protests of the Alevist 
movement during the 1990s.  As is the case concerning the Iranian Shiite interpretation of this 
holiday, the date is henceforth supposed to correspond to Ali’s birthday or his nomination by 
Mohammed.  These reappropriations (to each his or her own Noruz!) have not left Turkish 
leaders indifferent.  When a custom or rite becomes a symbol of opposition, the powers-that-
be have two possible solutions:  they can ban the offending activities, an approach which 
might lead to bitterness and rebellion, or they can appropriate them, by asserting patronage, 
even paternity.  Like the Qajar monarchs who organized sumptuous ta’zie in order to 
consolidate their popularity and stem the tide of religious opposition, Turkish leaders have 
officially celebrated Noruz since the mid 1990s, thus attempting to take the wind out of 
Kurdish and Alevi sails.  They unequivocally insist that Noruz is a tradition of Turkish origin, 
an interpretation obligingly confirmed by ethnologists and historians.  Isn’t the fact that the 
custom is officially celebrated in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, among the “Turks outside of 
Turkey,” proof of its Turkish roots?  (Although Noruz is in fact a contribution of Iranian 
civilization.)          
 Que Noruz présente toutes les qualités d’un bon candidat à l’inscription au patrimoine 
immatériel de l’humanité, cela ne fait pas de doute, on l’a dit. Mais la présentation qui en est 
faite dans le dossier de labellisation aseptise, chloroformise cette coutume et la vide d’une 
grande partie de ses significations. Est-ce sur cette base superficielle que peut s’engager « le 
dialogue interculturel » ? On en doute, sauf à se congratuler artificiellement.  
 
All in all, the recognition of a cultural asset as part of the “Masterpieces of the Oral and 
Intangible Heritage of Humanity” raises issues that go far beyond the area of mere 
ethnographic description.  Or, rather, it provides the ethnographer with the fortunate 
opportunity to exercise his or her art in all its splendour, not only by evaluating the accuracy 
of so-called factual information, but also by questioning the conjunctural backdrop of the 
                                                
6 Concerning the avatars of Nevruz in Turkey, see Massicard’s excellent synthesis (2002:  410-414). 
7 Concerning the revival and revitalization of traditions, see Bromberger and Chevallier (2003). 
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choices and decisions made.  The processes which lead one “candidate” to be selected over 
another and the relationships between the organizations that establish and present the files of 
potential candidates (research centres, NGOs, UNESCO national commissions, states, etc.) 
constitute particularly fertile ground for ethnographic research.  The questionable distinction 
between the “intangible” and “tangible” heritage also stimulates ethnographic reflection and 
critical examination 8 .  Furthermore UNESCO, by adopting the Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2003, has paved the way not only for 
wonderful opportunities to save threatened cultural assets, but also for a new area of 
anthropological research – and controversy9. 
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